Độ an toàn chứng minh được của lược đồ chữ ký FIAT-SHAMIR dựa trên ý tưởng của POINTCHEVAL
Abstract— In this paper, we analyze the “provable” security for Fiat-Shamir signature scheme based on the security proof methods of Pointcheval for signature schemes. In particular, in the “random oracle” model, assuming that the factorization problem is intractable, we can show that the security of Fiat-Shamir scheme is guaranteed. The security of this signature scheme will be analyzed in two scenarios: the no-message attack and the adaptively chosen message attack. In the former, Pointcheval and his partner proved that if the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme is unsecure against the no-message attack, then the factorization problem can be solved in polynomial time. In the latter, if the signer of signature scheme can be simulated with an indistinguishable distribution, then we will obtain the same result as the previous attack.
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Tài liệu tham khảo [1]. A. Fiat and A. Shamir. “How to Prove Yourself: practical solutions of identification and signature problems”. In A. M. Odlyzko, editor, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '86, vol. 263 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 186-194, Santa Barbara, California, 1987. Springer-Verlag. [2]. D. Pointcheval and J. Stern. “Security Proofs for Signature Schemes”. In Eurocrypt'96, LNCS1070, pp. 387-398. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996. [3]. David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern. “Security Arguments for Digital Signatures and Blind Signatures”, J. Cryptology, vol. 13, pp. 361-396, 2000. |
Triệu Quang Phong, Võ Tùng Linh
